Speaker:

Prof Edmund W Cheng
Professor, Department of Public and International Affairs; and
Associate Dean, College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences,
City University of Hong Kong

Date & Time:

Thursday, 20 November 2025
3:30pm – 5:00pm (Singapore Time)

On-site Venue:

469A Bukit Timah Rd, #06-01 Tower Block, Singapore 259770

Registration is required:

https://forms.office.com/r/hG887G0Y4j

Synopsis:

Why do governments without elections create systems that let ordinary citizens submit complaints or requests, even when these actions do not threaten social stability? Analysing a decade of data from China’s largest online petition platform of over 387,000 submissions, findings suggest that such mechanisms exist because central authorities delegate the responsibility for handling public concerns to provincial and prefectural officials who respond primarily to avoid penalties from their superiors and gather signaling information, not to enhance regime legitimacy or their careers. Using advanced data analysis techniques, it is found that government responsiveness improves when more agencies are involved and when the process for addressing concerns is more thorough, even after excluding complaints that might be considered contentious or sensitive. The speaker argues that, even without elections or direct public pressure, the establishment of vertical accountability, where bureaucrats are encountered with the downward transfer of responsibility can lead to better grievances management and service delivery for citizens. This approach highlights a new form of governance innovation in China, where digital tools help navigate the tension between central authority and local responsiveness.