This book, taking the example of long-term international negotiations on climate change and the Kyoto Protocol signed by most states as the first binding agreement in this area, analyses the huge economic cost of different states when controlling greenhouse gases domestically, as well as the limited and vague common interest that the Kyoto Protocol may achieve even when it is fully implemented. It also lists the differentiated interests that the Kyoto Protocol provides to various countries through the three “Flexibility Mechanisms,” including emission trading, joint implementation and clean development. The first two mechanisms help industrialised nations reduce the cost of cutting their greenhouse gas emissions, while the last will benefit both developed and developing countries when they jointly launch emission reduction projects. The trading may bring billions of dollars to transitional economies such as Russia and Ukraine that own “hot air,” a possibility that these countries might meet the Kyoto targets without any domestic action and will thus be able to sell their surplus emission allowance without incurring any abatement cost. The clean development mechanism will also help developing countries like China attract foreign investment worth billions of dollars at no cost. The author believes that this kind of individual benefit is the true incentive that pulls state actors into collective actions. Without such selective incentives, it is almost impossible for the international community to sign a binding agreement in the area of global warming.

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