

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY'S POLITICS 2024/2025: XI JINPING'S AMBITIONS AMID GROWING CHALLENGES

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Xi Jinping's leadership is focused on advancing China's superpower status, avoiding the "middle-income trap" by sustaining 5% economic growth annually and steering away from the "Thucydides Trap" to circumvent a military conflict with the United States. Nevertheless, falling consumption, overcapacity and inadequate domestic policy now threaten China's long-term macroeconomic trajectory. Donald Trump's victory in the US presidential election has also sparked concern in China, as many expect him to be tougher on China than his predecessor Joe Biden, exacerbating an already struggling economy.

Xi continues to diminish the role of the State Council and tighten control over government and military apparatuses. The purges within the military-industrial complex have intensified, with over a dozen senior leaders removed. Xi's dominance suppresses traditional factional politics, yet competing cliques persist within his power structure. Technocrats with science and technology backgrounds are emerging as key players, with figures like Ding Xuexiang and Chen Jining seen as potential successors. However, the lack of a clear political succession plan raises the risk of instability.

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Chinese:

中国共产党的政治 2024/2025：习近平在日益严峻的挑战中的雄心壮志

习近平领导层的重点是提升中国的超级大国地位，通过保持每年 5% 的经济增长来避免“中等收入陷阱”，并摆脱“修昔底德陷阱”以规避与美国的军事冲突。然而，消费下降、产能过剩和国内政策不足现在威胁着中国的长期宏观经济轨迹。唐纳德·特朗普在美国总统选举中的胜利也引发了中国的担忧，因为许多人预计他对中国的态度将比他的前任乔·拜登更强硬，从而加剧本已陷入困境的经济。

习近平继续削弱国务院的作用，加强对政府和军事机构的控制。军工联合体内部的清洗愈演愈烈，十多名高级领导人被撤职。习近平的主导地位压制了传统的派系政治，但他的权力结构中仍然存在相互竞争的派系。具有科技背景的技术官僚正在成为关键人物，丁薛祥和陈吉宁等人被视为潜在的继任者。然而，缺乏明确的政治继任计划会增加不稳定的风险。

French:

LA POLITIQUE DU PARTI COMMUNISTE CHINOIS 2024/2025: LES AMBITIONS DE XI JINPING AU MILIEU DE DÉFIS CROISSANTS

Le leadership de Xi Jinping s'efforce de faire progresser le statut de superpuissance de la Chine, en évitant le « piège du revenu intermédiaire » en maintenant une croissance économique de 5 % par an et en s'éloignant du « piège de Thucydide » pour contourner un conflit militaire avec les États-Unis. Néanmoins, la baisse de la consommation, la surcapacité et une politique intérieure inadaptée menacent désormais la trajectoire macroéconomique à long terme de la Chine. La victoire de Donald Trump à l'élection présidentielle américaine a également suscité des inquiétudes en Chine, car beaucoup s'attendent à ce qu'il se montre plus dur envers la Chine que son prédécesseur Joe Biden, exacerbant ainsi une économie déjà en difficulté.

Xi continue de diminuer le rôle du Conseil d'État et de renforcer son contrôle sur les appareils gouvernementaux et militaires. Les purges au sein du complexe militaro-industriel se sont intensifiées, avec la destitution de plus d'une douzaine de hauts dirigeants. La domination de Xi supprime les politiques factionnelles traditionnelles, mais des cliques concurrentes persistent au sein de sa structure de pouvoir. Les technocrates issus des sciences et de la technologie apparaissent comme des acteurs clés, avec des personnalités comme Ding Xuexiang et Chen Jining considérées comme des successeurs potentiels. Toutefois, l'absence d'un plan de succession politique clair accroît le risque d'instabilité.

Spanish:

LA POLÍTICA DEL PARTIDO COMUNISTA CHINO 2024/2025: LAS AMBICIONES DEL XI JINPING ENTRE DESAFÍOS CRECIENTES

El liderazgo de Xi Jinping se centra en promover el estatus de superpotencia de China, evitando la “trampa del ingreso medio” manteniendo un crecimiento económico del 5% anual y alejándose de la “trampa de Tucídides” para eludir un conflicto militar con Estados Unidos. Sin embargo, la caída del consumo, el exceso de capacidad y una política interna inadecuada amenazan ahora la trayectoria macroeconómica de largo plazo de China. La victoria de Donald Trump en las elecciones presidenciales de Estados Unidos también ha generado preocupación en China, ya que muchos esperan que sea más duro con China que su predecesor Joe Biden, exacerbando una economía que ya estaba en dificultades.

Xi continúa disminuyendo el papel del Consejo de Estado y reforzando el control sobre los aparatos gubernamentales y militares. Las purgas dentro del complejo militar-industrial se han intensificado y más de una docena de altos dirigentes han sido destituidos. El dominio de Xi suprime la política tradicional entre facciones, pero aún así persisten camarillas en competencia dentro de su estructura de poder. Los tecnócratas con experiencia en ciencia y tecnología están surgiendo como actores clave, y figuras como Ding Xuexiang y Chen Jining se consideran posibles sucesores. Sin embargo, la falta de un plan de sucesión política claro aumenta el riesgo de inestabilidad.

Executive Summary

1. Xi Jinping called for breakthroughs in reform, development and technology by 2029 at the Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in July 2024, setting the stage for his fourth term as CCP General Secretary (2027-2032).
2. His political performances as justification for the fourth term include making progress in the economy, reform and technology, uplifting of China's global status to a level on par with the United States and addressing the Taiwan issue.
3. China would need to avoid two traps: the “middle income trap” by maintaining China's annual economic growth at about 5% and the “Thucydides trap”, which involves avoiding direct military conflicts with the United States, the status quo superpower.
4. Nevertheless, falling consumption, overcapacity and inadequate policy intervention at home now threaten China's long-term macroeconomic trajectory. Additionally, Donald Trump's victory in the US presidential election has sparked concern of a tougher stance on China compared to his predecessor Joe Biden, with repercussions for an already struggling economy.
5. Xi's anti-corruption campaign since 2012 is continuing unabated in the name of “self-revolution” (自我革命). The Party confirmed the expulsion of former Defence Minister Li Shangfu and his predecessor Wei Fenghe, and the suspension of Central Military Commission (CMC) member Miao Hua from duty in 2024.
6. The Party Plenum in 2024 did not announce the anticipated promotion of Defence Minister Dong Jun to the CMC, indicating a trust deficit.
7. As the former factions seem to have dissipated, new factions under Xi's supreme umbrella of power have emerged. Factions linked to Fujian, Zhejiang, Shaanxi, Shanghai and Shandong, Tsinghua University and military-industrial complex can be identified.

8. Xi's anti-corruption campaign has hurt vested interests in China's military-industrial complex, with major defence industry executives ensnared.
9. The CCP is expected to finalise proposals for the 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP 2026-2030) in 2025. More proactive and impactful macro policies will be implemented to sustain the economy and fulfil the goals of the 14th FYP (2021-2025).
10. Chinese negotiators will continue to strive for maintaining a balance in future talks with the new Trump administration. It would be unrealistic to expect China to make huge concessions unilaterally as it will ignite nationalistic sentiments and incur political backlash domestically.