

**CABINET INSTABILITY IN TAIWAN:
EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATURE
RELATIONS, INTRA-PARTY POLITICS,
PUBLIC OPINION AND ELECTION (II)**

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Executive Summary

1. Taiwan's Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen administrations are examples of majority governments. The Legislative Yuan is dominated by their respective parties, thereby contributing to cabinet stability with the reduction in executive-legislature tensions.
2. Similarly, the two administrations are much less troubled by party factionalism which in theory, should contribute to the two administrations' stability. Nevertheless, the two administrations remain as unstable as the Chen Shui-bian administration.
3. What has replaced executive-legislature tensions and party factionalism in destabilising the cabinet has been an increasingly critical public since 2008.
4. Elections, which may be viewed as a special form of public opinion, remain as a significant source of cabinet instability since 2008.
5. Public disapproval and elections have significantly contributed to cabinet instability at both premier and cabinet member levels.
6. Taiwanese politicians have a good understanding of the problems faced by Taiwan's current semi-presidentialism and the issue of constitutional reforms, especially during election seasons, has been a topic of heated debate. While the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) generally prefers parliamentarism, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) prioritises presidentialism.
7. However, most discussions on presidentialism, parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism ignore the role of public opinions in destabilising the government. Facing an increasingly more polarised and critical public, the stability of a better streamlined government system, regardless of the constitutional form it adopts, is still an uncertainty.