

**JAPAN'S JULY 2010 UPPER HOUSE ELECTION:
POLITICAL GRIDLOCK AHEAD**

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Executive Summary

1. The ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) captured only 44 out of 121 seats in the July 2010 Upper House Election, thus losing control of the Upper House to the opposition parties.
2. Japan is now governed by a “split parliament” with the DPJ in control of the Lower House while the opposition parties dominate the Upper House.
3. Unless Prime Minister Kan and the DPJ can forge a coalition with other political parties to form a majority in the Upper House, Japan will inevitably face a gridlock in policymaking and governance.
4. The DPJ does not have a two-thirds majority in the Lower House to override the veto of the Upper House over legislative bills.
5. The July 2010 Upper House Election was considered a referendum on the ten-month rule by the DPJ government and the electorate has registered its dissatisfaction in no uncertain terms.
6. The plunge in the DPJ’s popularity is, in part, due to Kan’s poorly thought out proposal to raise consumption tax from five to ten percent without due deliberation and consultation within his party and with other political groupings and the public.
7. While 61 percent of the public actually acknowledges that a hike in the consumption tax is unavoidable given the parlous nature of Japan’s public debt, the electorate is also mindful that the DPJ had earlier promised not to raise the consumption tax after the August 2009 Lower House Election.
8. This September, Kan may well face a challenger who is a proxy of Ozawa Ichiro (the leader of the largest DPJ faction) for the party presidency. If Kan

loses the DPJ presidential election, he will forfeit his position as Japanese Prime Minister.

9. Even if Kan survives this leadership challenge within the DPJ, he will have an uphill task steering legislation through a split parliament. Kan's credibility as Prime Minister is likely to weaken and he may not last long in office.
10. Japan's place in Asia and the world is handicapped by weak Prime Ministers who did not stay long enough to forge personal relationship with leaders of great powers especially President Obama and President Hu Jintao.

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LAM Peng Er*

Split Parliament and Policy Paralysis again

- 1.1 The ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) captured only 44 out of 121 seats in the July 2010 Upper House Elections while the main opposition Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won 51 (Appendix).¹ The ruling party's electoral defeat resulted in the loss of the Upper House to the opposition parties.
- 1.2 It is a case of *déjà vu* in Japanese politics: the ruling party controls the Lower House while the opposition parties dominate the Upper House leading to a gridlock in policymaking and governance. This scenario first took place after Prime Minister Abe Shinzo of the then ruling LDP lost the 2007 Upper House Election.
- 1.3 After finding this "split parliament" framework untenable, Abe resigned shortly after as Prime Minister. His LDP successor Fukuda Yasuo also resigned in frustration barely a year in office after finding it difficult to govern amidst a split parliament. This split parliament ended only when the DPJ captured power in the August 2009 Lower House Election and with its allies controlled both the Lower and Upper Houses.

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¹ The Upper House has 242 seats and half (121) are up for elections every three years. Upper House members are elected from two components: constituencies which coincide with the boundaries of prefectures and national proportional representation by party list. The DPJ today has only 106 seats out of 242 seats in the Upper House. It had 116 seats before the July 2010 Upper House Election.

- 1.4 It is uncertain whether Kan can survive considerably longer as Prime Minister than his LDP predecessors given the propensity of a policy gridlock due to a split parliament. If Kan is forced to quit within a year, then Japan would have had six Prime Ministers since 2006 --- surely a recipe for weak leadership and bad governance.²
- 1.5 The combined votes of the two major parties continue to decline while smaller and newer parties concomitantly increase their electoral support.³ Instead of an anticipated two-party system emerging in Japan, a “two-party plus” system of two weak major parties coupled with smaller parties (such as the Komeito [Clean Government Party] and the Minna no to [Your Party]) holding a casting vote is evolving. The Komeito and Your Party won 9 and 10 seats respectively in the latest Upper House Election.
- 1.6 Although the DPJ has lost control of the Upper House, it retains a stable majority in the more powerful Lower House and will remain the governing party for the next three years if the Prime Minister retains the confidence of the Lower House and chooses not to dissolve the Lower House earlier. But Prime Minister Kan’s leadership credibility has been severely dented by this electoral setback.
- 1.7 Unless Prime Minister Kan and the DPJ can forge a coalition with other political parties to form a majority in the Upper House, Japan will inevitably face a policy gridlock.⁴ The DPJ does not have a two-thirds majority in the Lower House to override the veto of the Upper House over legislative bills.

² The Prime Ministers since 2006 are Koizumi Junichiro, Abe Shinzo, Fukuda Yasuo, Aso Taro, Hatoyama Yukio and Kan Naoto.

³ In 2007, the combined votes of the two major parties, the LDP and DPJ, comprised 67.56 percent of total votes cast in the proportional representation component of the Upper House. Three years later, the combined votes of the two major parties comprised only 55.63 percent of total votes cast in the same component of the Upper House. Statistics from *Sankei Shimbun*, 13 July 2010. See also “Major parties’ grip on upper house slipping” in *Daily Yomiuri Online*, 10 July 2010.

⁴ See, for example, “Weakened Kan faces policy gridlock in Diet”, *Asahi Shimbun*, 13 July 2010. See also “Divided Diet promises gridlock” in *Daily Yomiuri Online*, 12 July 2010.

- 1.8 Between 2007 and 2009 during the short tenures of Prime Ministers Abe Shinzo, Fukuda Yasuo and Aso Taro, the then ruling LDP had a two-thirds majority in the Lower House to override the objections of the Upper House. Even then, Japan suffered from a policy gridlock because the Upper House could still block key appointments to institutions such as the Bank of Japan. Lacking a two-thirds majority, Prime Minister Kan is likely to face a worse policy impasse than that encountered by his LDP predecessors.
- 1.9 More policy paralysis is a terrible outcome for a Japan mired in two decades of economic stagnation and poised to lose its status as the world's second largest economy to a rising China end 2010. Perennial problems such as slow growth, a public debt close to 200 percent of GDP, insolvency of the pension system, an ageing population, a lack of good and stable jobs for young workers, and the political taboo of raising the consumption tax will be even more difficult to address given the split parliament again.

Kan's Tactical Blunder: proposal to hike the consumption tax

- 2.1 The July 2010 Upper House Election has been the first national poll faced by the DPJ since its landslide victory in August 2009 which ended 54 years of LDP one-party dominance. It was also considered a referendum on the ten-month rule by the DPJ government and the electorate registered its dissatisfaction with the ruling coalition in no uncertain terms.
- 2.2 At the outset of the Upper House Election campaigning, Prime Minister Kan appeared confident after his administration registered 68 percent of public opinion support at its inauguration --- a considerable upswing from his predecessor Hatoyama's popularity of only 20 percent.⁵
- 2.3 The plummeting of the DPJ's popularity is, in part, due to Kan's abrupt and cavalier proposal to raise consumption tax from five to ten percent without due deliberation and consultation within his party and with other political

⁵ See "Cabinet approval rate dives to 50 percent" in *Nikkei Weekly*, 28 June 2010.

groupings and the public. While the tax debacle had undoubtedly caused the DPJ dearly at the Upper House Election, there was also profound disappointment with the ten-month-old DPJ rule since its historic victory in the Lower House Election in August 2009.

- 2.4 While the Hatoyama administration's review of wasteful projects and spending by state corporations was welcomed by the public, there was also disquiet with Hatoyama's wavering leadership and broken promises especially over the relocation of the US marine base at Futenma to Henoko, Okinawa. And Kan's initial popularity could not erase the Futenma fiasco from the memories of voters.
- 2.5 The public is also aware that the new DPJ government is confronted with fiscal problems in its attempts to implement a key feature of its manifesto promised in the August 2009 Lower House Election --- the provision of a monthly 26,000 yen to each child to defray the cost of education and livelihood. Moreover, the DPJ government also struggles to remove road tolls (another key platform of its manifesto) and has yet to explain to the public where the revenue shortfall to maintain the toll-free national highways is coming from.
- 2.6 While 61 percent of the public actually acknowledges that a hike in the consumption tax is unavoidable given the parlous nature of Japan's public debt and the insolvency of the pension system, the public is also mindful that the DPJ had earlier promised not to raise the consumption tax after the August 2009 Lower House Election.⁶
- 2.7 When Kan was Finance Minister during the Hatoyama administration, he remarked that the financial crisis of Greece might be a harbinger of a similar problem in Japan if the latter does not address its public debt of almost 200

⁶ A nationwide survey conducted at polling station exits for the 2010 Upper House Election actually revealed that 61 percent of voters believe an increase in the consumption tax rate is necessary in the near future. See "61 percent of voters consider hike in consumption tax necessary", *Daily Yomiuri Online*, 13 July 2010.

percent GDP.⁷ He also believes that a tax hike is compatible to a sound economy, fiscal reconstruction and a strong welfare system. Apparently, Kan dropped the bombshell of a tax hike proposal at the outset of the Upper House Election thinking that the public would simply swallow the inevitable.⁸

2.8 Arguably, the public was angry not simply because the topic of a tax hike was raised by Kan but because the DPJ seems to break its electoral promises (including not raising taxes) so easily and indifferently.⁹ Even more annoying to the public is Kan's wavering and dithering position on the consumption tax when he ran into criticisms from other opposition parties, news media and the public. In this regard, Kan's indecisive and inarticulate leadership style seems similar to Hatoyama's zigzag approach towards the Futenma problem.

2.9 Kan first said that he will use the opposition LDP's proposal of a ten percent hike as a reference point for his consumption tax scheme. But Kan failed to explain clearly to the public why a consumption tax is needed and how the poor and needy can be insulated by the regressive nature of a consumption tax, and provide a road map for a hike in the consumption tax.

⁷ The media reported: "Kan has declared that Japan needs to reform its tax structure and should seriously consider raising the consumption tax from 5 percent to 10 percent within two to three years. He has warned that if Japan doesn't take dramatic steps soon, it could face a similar crisis to Greece --- a comparison experts say is an exaggeration". See "tax hike gambit may end up hurting DPJ" in *Japan Times*, 8 July 2010.

The media wrote: "Kan previously had been wary about raising the consumption tax because it would be an unpopular move. However, he had a change of heart after attending Group of Seven meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors in Canada in February, according to senior Finance Ministry officials. It was at the gathering, the officials said, that Kan realized the seriousness of the fiscal crisis in Greece and its ramifications for the global economy. He then began to think about Japan's fiscal ills in light of the Greek situation. He became alarmed". See "Kan's dilemma: Is Japan ready to pay?", *Asahi Shimbun*, 29 June 2010.

⁸ Kan delivered the message poorly. The public thought that he was going to raise taxes after the Upper House Election whereas he meant to say that the government will start preparing to reform the entire tax system by the next general election.

⁹ The media noted: "Missing from the DPJ's manifesto, unveiled June 17, are two planks upon which it campaigned ahead of last summer's lower house election. Now that it has been in power for nine months, it has apparently changed its mind on vowing not to hike the consumption tax for four years and that there is plenty of government waste to slash". See "DPJ talks of doubling sales tax" in *Nikkei Weekly*, 21 June 2010.

- 2.10 Kan then improvised by proposing tax rebates for the poor and weaker elements of the society but these were clearly not well thought out.¹⁰ Unclear too are the priorities which the Kan wants to spend the additional tax revenue on: Reduce the state's fiscal deficits, pay for the rising costs of the pension system and medical care for an ageing society, build more child care and nursing centers, offer more child allowances or cover the short falls from abolished road tolls?¹¹
- 2.11 Voters were left guessing as to how the figure of a ten percent consumption tax was also arrived at and whether it was really enough to pay for the DPJ's ambitious welfare spending.¹² Many took the figure as Kan's plagiarism of the opposition LDP's manifesto.
- 2.12 Sensing that the electoral support for the DPJ was sinking fast during the Upper House campaign due to the confusion over the consumption tax proposal, Kan then backpedaled and said that he was only suggesting discussions with other political parties over the issue and would not raise a single yen of consumption tax until the next Lower House election.¹³ By then the damage to Kan's credibility had already been done.

¹⁰ Kan said: "We will discuss a system in which all the tax payments would be returned to those whose annual income is 3 to 4 million or less". But in other election speeches, Kan inconsistently said that refunds could be made to those whose annual income is 2 to 3 million or less. This is indeed very confusing to the public. See "Kan talks of income-based sales tax refunds" in *Nikkei Weekly*, 5 July 2010.

On various schemes to mitigate the regressive nature of a consumption tax, see "Reducing regressiveness of consumption tax" in *Daily Yomiuri Online*, 11 July 2010. But Kan was short on details about such measures.

¹¹ The media noted: "If all expressways across the nation become toll-free in principle, excluding the Shuto Expressway and the Hanshin Expressway, as the DPJ plans, it would mean a loss of 1.8 trillion yen a year in toll income, which must be shouldered by the public". See "Editorial: Toll-free expressways", *Asahi Shimbun*, 8 July 2010.

¹² According to one report: "The worse news is that the tax will have to go to at least 20 percent and maybe as high as 37 percent if Japan wants to escape the debt trap, according to economists who have looked closely at the government's own figures" in "Japan's economic fantasy", *Japan Times*, 8 July 2010.

¹³ Kan backpedaled and said: "I wouldn't raise the consumption tax even by one yen, until the next House of Representatives election". See "Consumption tax key issue in today's poll", *Daily Yomiuri Online*, 11 July 2010.

- 2.13 Raising a tax hike proposal without preparing the ground within the DPJ and the public before a general election is nothing less than a political blunder and naivety on the part of Kan. Previous governments have suffered losses at the polls over the introduction or hiking of a consumption tax and it is indeed surprising that Kan has shot himself in the foot.
- 2.14 In 1987, the ruling LDP led by then Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro did poorly in the Local Elections after he raised the possibility of a consumption tax after promising earlier not to do so. In 1989, the LDP lost the Upper House for the first time to the then main opposition Japan Socialist Party (JSP) largely due to then Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru's introduction of an unpopular consumption tax. Then Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro had to resign to take responsibility for his party's electoral defeat.¹⁴

A Divided DPJ and Possible Leadership Tussle in September 2010

- 3.1 Besides a split parliament, Kan will be facing a deeply divided DPJ with many of its members blaming him personally for the party's defeat in the Upper House. Earlier, Ozawa Ichiro, the former DPJ Secretary General and a bigwig within the party, and Hatoyama Yukio, the former DPJ president, had criticized Kan for reneging on the party's promise not to raise the consumption tax.¹⁵
- 3.2 Apparently, there is also a great deal of bad feeling among the Ozawa group which felt that the Kan-led DPJ did not sufficiently support the candidates handpicked by Ozawa for the 2010 Upper House Election. Ozawa's strategy to comprehensively defeat the opposition LDP was to run two DPJ candidates in most constituencies where there are at least two seats to be grabbed within an electoral district.¹⁶

¹⁴ See "Consumption tax: the undoing of cabinets past" in *Nikkei Weekly*, 21 June 2010.

¹⁵ See "Ozawa often at odds with DPJ leaders", *Daily Yomiuri Online*, 4 July 2010.

¹⁶ See "Ozawa strategy of fielding rival DPJ candidates fails", *Japan Times*, 13 July 2010. The media reported: "Ozawa personally selected the second candidate among the two whom the DPJ is running in multi-member districts. Because most of those second candidates are not incumbents, they

- 3.3 One DPJ candidate was to be an incumbent supported by organized interest groups especially labor unions while the other DPJ candidate was likely to be a fresh face (often attractive female candidates known as “Ozawa’s girls”) to appeal to non-party affiliated voters.
- 3.4 But many DPJ incumbents and members felt that Ozawa’s approach to field two candidates in an electoral district was too sanguine amidst the declining popularity of the DPJ (in part, due to the financial scandals of Ozawa and Hatoyama Yukio).
- 3.5 The result of the 2010 Upper House Election was attributed to the failed strategy of fielding dual candidates in some electoral districts. The recrimination and bad blood between the Ozawa and anti-Ozawa groups are also likely to bedevil Kan’s bid to win the DPJ presidency in September 2010.
- 3.6 This September, Kan may well face a presidential challenger who is a proxy of Ozawa. The latter’s quest for the presidency is uncertain because he may be indicted for political corruption. Nevertheless, Ozawa leads the largest DPJ faction comprising around 150 members of parliament and remains a formidable opponent to a now politically weakened Kan as party president.
- 3.7 If Kan loses the DPJ presidential election in September, he will forfeit his position as Japanese Prime Minister. And if Kan becomes a Prime Minister for merely four months (June to September 2010), Japanese politics and leadership will become even more farcical than tragic.

Wooing New Partners in the Upper House

- 4.1 To avoid the gridlock of a split government, Kan will seek new partners in the Upper House. But Kan may encounter considerable difficulties finding a junior partner who is willing to prop up a politically wounded Prime Minister.

are facing an uphill battle. Ozawa’s backers are angry that the DPJ is not sending cabinet ministers and party executives to help drum up support for those second candidates”. See “Ozawa still grabbing lots of attention”, *Asahi Shimbun*, 9 July 2010.

- 4.2 Conceivably, the DPJ government has three potential partners: the LDP, the Komeito and Your Party. Kan's problem is that all three parties have declared that they will not be in coalition with the DPJ.
- 4.3 The first option of a grand alliance with the LDP (with 84 Upper House seats) is not unthinkable. Germany had a grand coalition of two ideologically unlikely allies comprising the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats. There was also a precedent in Japan when erstwhile enemies LDP and the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) forged an "unholy alliance" in 1995 to become a ruling coalition despite their ideological incompatibility.
- 4.4 Moreover, then Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo and Ozawa Ichiro (then president of the DPJ) came close to forging a grand coalition to avoid a split parliament. But the scheme collapsed due to opposition within the DPJ.
- 4.5 In actuality, the ideological distance between the ruling DPJ and the opposition LDP is not very wide. Both parties are pro-capital, support a strong US-Japan alliance and may seek common ground on various issues including a consumption tax hike in the future to avoid an impending fiscal crisis.
- 4.6 The second option is an alliance with the Komeito which has 19 seats in the Upper House. Although the Komeito has rebuffed any suggestions of an alliance with the DPJ, it actually has more common ground on certain policies with the DPJ than with the LDP. Both the Komeito and DPJ are sympathetic to enfranchising foreigners who are long term residents and taxpayers to vote in local elections, and are also pro-welfare in orientation.
- 4.7 The third option is a pact with Your Party with 11 Upper House seats. Your Party has declared that it is agreeable to cooperate with the DPJ only on a case by case basis if the ruling party is willing to adopt its political agenda.¹⁷ Your Party appeals to young urbanites, entrepreneurs and their admirers, and advocates small government, political reforms and market deregulation to

¹⁷ "Your Party no party to ruling bloc", *Japan Times*, 13 July 2010.

stimulate the Japanese economy. The DPJ and Your Party have the common ground of taming Japan's powerful bureaucracy but Your Party is against any consumption tax hike.

- 4.8 Your Party was formed only in August 2009 and led by Watanabe Yoshimi, a former LDP minister of state for financial services and administrative reform during the Fukuda administration. While it is unclear whether it will become a mere shooting star in the long run, Your Party gained much media attraction and considerable voter support (especially among those disappointed with the two major parties) as the "third force" in Japanese politics.
- 4.9 Matsuda Kota, a candidate of Your Party and a former Tully's Coffee Japan Company President gained much media attention by competing in the very competitive five-member electoral district of Tokyo. Matsuda won with 10.8 percent. According to Matsuda, he stayed in Singapore for two years and attributed his positive sojourn in the city-state as an impetus to think about what is wrong with Japan and drove him to take the plunge into politics to transform a moribund Japan.¹⁸
- 4.10 Another candidate of Your Party who has a Singapore connection is Nakagawa Kenichi who competed in the Hokkaido constituency. Although he won 11.6 percent of the votes, he failed to capture a seat in the two-member Hokkaido district. Nakagawa worked as a staff of the Hokkaido prefectural government in its Singapore office between 2003 and 2006 to promote tourism and products of that prefecture. He is married to a Singapore girl and has declared in his personal website that the two politicians he admires most are

¹⁸ See "Kouta Matsuda: Official Website". <<http://koutamatsuda.com/profile>> (Accessed: 13 July 2010).

The media reported: "Matsuda said Japan should emulate the economic policy of Singapore, where his business had been based for the past two years. The city-state has been drawing foreign investment with incentives such as lower taxes, and its per capita gross domestic product has already surpassed that of Japan". "Your Party touting smaller government", *Japan Times*, 1 July 2010.

Matsuda said: "For the last two years I've been working in Singapore, and I feel a great sense of crisis about Japan's current situation. Japan is losing its vitality in inverse proportion to the vibrancy in the rest of Asia. The only way to restore Japan's vitality once again is for politicians to exert leadership and initiate various reforms" in "Your Party pins its hopes on fiscal responsibility", *Asahi Shimbun*, 3 July 2010.

Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew and Watanabe Yoshimi (leader of Your Party).¹⁹ Nakagawa resigned from the Hokkaido prefectural government in 2010 to compete in the Upper House Election.

Conclusion: More Uncertainty for Japanese Politics Ahead

- 5.1 While it is uncertain whether Kan can survive a leadership challenge in September 2010 or continue as a Prime Minister who can steer a split parliament, it is clear that his leadership credibility is now very much weakened. More severe policy gridlock is anticipated especially when the DPJ lacks a two-thirds majority to override the veto of the Upper House.
- 5.2 Kan's electoral loss in the Upper House and the lack of a national consensus mean that he and other political leaders will find it most difficult to address the rising national debt problem in the near future.²⁰ Indeed, electoral democracies including Japan appear to have a propensity for more welfare spending to win votes while hesitant to raise more taxes and alienate the electorate.
- 5.3 The main opposition LDP appears to have rebounded since its consecutive defeats in the 2007 Upper House Election and the 2009 Lower House Election.²¹ On the average, its candidates in the 2010 Upper House Election are even younger than the DPJ's.²² The LDP, therefore, seems to be changing its image as a party led by old men hailing from political dynasties. Arguably, the viability of the LDP as an opposition party is necessary for a stable "two-party plus" system.

¹⁹ See "Nakagawa Kenichi: Profile". <<http://www.your.nakagawa.jp/profile>> (Accessed: 13 July 2010).

²⁰ "Kan tax-hike talk now on ice" in *Japan Times*, 13 July 2010.

²¹ "LDP basks in first solid performance in years", *Japan Times*, 13 July 2010.

²² The media noted: "This time, 16 of the LDP's 29 candidates in constituencies with one seat on the line are new faces. The average age of LDP candidates is 48.3, seven years younger than in previous election. Indeed, with DPJ candidates having an average age of 50, the familiar perception of the LDP fielding young challengers to older LDP rivals is also turned on its head in this election". See "New rules for changing game" in *Daily Yomiuri Online*, 26 June 2010.

- 5.4 The 2010 Upper House Election also saw a proliferation of new parties seeking to benefit from voter disillusionment with the two major parties, the DPJ and LDP. While the Sunrise Party and the Reform Party succeeded in winning one seat each, the only new party of note is Your Party. While its long term future is unpredictable, Your Party might well turn out to be a kingmaker in the short run.
- 5.5 Security and diplomatic issues which appeared in the 2010 election manifestoes of the DPJ and the LDP were hardly mentioned during election campaigning. In this regard, all politics is local in Japan.
- 5.6 Indeed, both major parties hold similar views in their manifestoes: the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance, good relations with Japan's neighbors including China, and in the case of the DPJ, the coming to fruition of the East Asian Community.²³ The LDP manifesto also called for the establishment of a new Constitution and a new law that would allow for the expeditious overseas dispatch of Self-Defense Force personnel for international cooperation and disaster relief.²⁴
- 5.7 Simply put, the manifestoes of the major parties reiterate their intent to strengthen Japan's alliance with the US and to maintain good relations with its Asian neighbors. But Japan's place in Asia and the world is handicapped by weak Prime Ministers who did not stay long enough to forge personal friendship and trust with leaders of great powers especially President Obama and President Hu Jintao.

²³ The media noted that the DPJ's diplomatic policies in the July 2010 Upper House Election is in contrast to its manifesto in the August 2009 Lower House Election when the DPJ distanced itself from the US and promised to review the planned realignment of US forces. The same article notes: "Also attracting attention is the DPJ's pledge to seek greater transparency from China about its military buildup. The DPJ does not refer to territorial issues between Japan and neighboring countries, but the LDP pledges to take a firm stance against China over that nation's claim on the Senkaku Island, located close to the main island of Okinawa". See "Two sides of the same coin?", *Daily Yomiuri Online*, 6 July 2010.

²⁴ See Jiminto, *Jiminto Seikasu shu: Manifesuto* [Compilation of LDP Policies: Manifesto], 2010. See also "LDP returns to its conservative roots with manifesto", *Asahi Shimbun*, 17 May 2010.

APPENDIX

JULY 2010 UPPER HOUSE ELECTION: RESULTS

Parties	Electoral districts	PR	Combined	Seats (Not up for elections)	Total
DPJ	28	16	44	62	106
LDP	39	12	51	33	84
Komeito	3	6	9	10	19
Your Party	3	7	10	1	11
JCP	0	3	3	3	6
PNP	0	0	0	3	3
SDP	0	2	2	2	4
RP	0	1	1	1	2
SP	0	1	1	2	3
Others	0	0	0	4	4
Total	73	48	121	121	242

JCP: Japan Communist Party

PNP: People's New Party

SDP: Social Democratic Party

RP: Reform Party

SP: Sunrise Party

Source: *Sankei Shimbun*, 13 July 2010.