

**THE UNITED STATES AND NEW DYNAMICS
IN CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS**

WANG Jianwei

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Executive Summary

1. After Ma Yin-jeou was elected president of Taiwan in March 2008, cross-strait relations have experienced sea changes. Tension has been significantly reduced and economic, cultural and human exchanges between the two sides have reached an unprecedented level.
2. The new dynamics in cross-strait relations provide the United States with both new opportunities and challenges. With the rapid thawing of Beijing-Taipei relations, Washington's influence to define the status quo and direction of cross-strait relations is likely to decline.
3. Nevertheless the United States is still a crucial factor in the development of cross-strait relations. It could either hinder or facilitate the rapprochement between Beijing and Taipei when cross-strait relations move from 'low politics' to 'high politics' to deal with more difficult political and military/security issues.
4. Officially Washington supports and encourages cross-strait dialogues. Unofficially, the American attitude is more ambivalent. Some feel uncomfortable about the fast improving Beijing-Taipei relations and worry about the increasing political, economic, and military "imbalance" between China and Taiwan.
5. Some political forces in Washington advocate upgrading U.S.-Taiwan political relations. So far White House has handled this issue with caution as reflected in Washington's restraints in handling Ma Ying's jeou's 'transit visit' to the U.S. Yet Taiwan may ask for more and Washington may find it hard to refuse in the future.
6. The formation of cross-strait military confidence-building measures (CBMs) could also be constrained by the American factor. Taipei is more reluctant to move forward largely because it involves Taiwan's military relations with the

United States. While Beijing attempts to use the military CBMs to minimize U.S-Taiwan military ties, Taipei is not ready to pay such a high price.

7. Washington is not enthusiastic about cross-strait military CBMs either. It shies away from hosting the direct talk between the two militaries across the Taiwan Strait. Some in the U.S. military also worry about the possible leaking of American military technology and information to China through military CBMs.
8. The “biggest obstacle” that the United States could create for the cross-strait thaw from Beijing’s perspective is its arms sales to Taiwan. Bush’s decision of arms sales in October 2009 crippled Sino-American military relations, which has not fully recovered even today. A new arms sale by the Obama administration could once again disrupt and destabilize China-U.S.-Taiwan trilateral relations.
9. Therefore with the new dynamics in cross-strait relations unfolding it is time for all three parties to take a more creative approach to find a way to manage, if not completely resolve, this issue and take parallel actions to defuse this ‘time bomb’ in their relationships.

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New dynamics in cross-strait relations

- 1.1 Since Ma Yin-jeou was elected president of Taiwan in March 2008, cross-strait relations have experienced sea changes. Based on the “1992 consensus,” Beijing and Taipei resumed semi-official dialogues, which were suspended for the prior nine years, less than a month after Ma was sworn in. The two sides have reached nine agreements and one consensus in the short time span of one year. As a result, economic, cultural and human exchanges between the two sides have now reached an unprecedented level.
- 1.2 The dazzling and swift improvement in cross-strait relations has significantly reduced the probability of military conflict in the region, turning a once “highly dangerous” water into “fairly tranquil” water. It also subtly began to change the dynamics of China-U.S.-Taiwan trilateral relations, which for a long time was characterized by zero-sum calculation and mentality.
- 1.3 The more benign new reality across the Taiwan Strait provides the United States with new opportunities as well as new challenges. For a long time, the United States played the role of a self-invited arbitrator and balancer in cross-strait disputes between Beijing and Taipei. Washington made it clear that it opposed either side unilaterally changing the status quo, as defined by the United States.¹

* Dr. Jianwei Wang is a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at EAI. He would like to thank Professor John Wong for his valuable comments and guidance.

¹ James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, “Overview of U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan,” Testimony at a hearing on Taiwan, House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC. Apr. 21, 2004, <http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2004/31649.htm>.

- 1.4 When tensions in the Taiwan Strait were high and there was little direct contact between China and Taiwan, Washington was in a better position to define the status quo, as both Beijing and Taipei sought Washington's support. With the rapid thawing of cross-strait relations and the proliferation of multiple channels of communications between Beijing and Taipei, Washington's clout to influence the direction of future development in cross-strait relations is likely to decline.
- 1.5 While the United States needs to make some policy adjustment to adapt to the new environment in cross-strait relations, it is still a crucial factor in the equation. By its political, economic and military presence in the region, it could either facilitate or hinder the rapprochement between Beijing and Taipei particularly when cross-strait relations move from 'low politics' to 'high politics' to deal with more difficult political and military/security issues.

Encouraging cross-strait dialogues

- 2.1 Immediately after the 2008 presidential election in Taiwan, President Bush issued a statement and also personally called Chinese President Hu Jintao, urging both sides to seize this "fresh opportunity" to reach out and engage one another to "build essential foundations for peace and stability."² Other senior American officials and scholars made similar pleas. This official line of endorsing cross-strait rapprochement has been maintained from the Bush administration to the Obama administration.
- 2.2 Washington repeatedly denied the allegations that the United States was apprehensive about the fast-growing cross-strait ties. More recently in receiving high ranking officials in charge of cross-strait affairs from both Beijing and Taipei, Obama administration officials reiterated Washington's satisfaction with the development of cross-strait relations.

² White House, "Statement by the President on Taiwan election," March 22, 2009; "Statement by the Press Secretary, March 26, 2008.

- 2.3 After talking to American officials, congressmen, and think tank people, Lai Shin-yuan, Minister of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, concluded that "the American government is delighted" that "cross-strait relations are no longer a headache, but a blessing."³ Senior Obama administration officials also reassured visiting Wang Yi, Minister of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the Chinese State Council, that the United States appreciates the progress made in cross-strait relations and supports the deepening of cooperation in various areas on both sides of the strait.⁴

Concerns about cross-strait "imbalance"

- 3.1 The open endorsement of cross-strait rapprochement, needless to say, does not mean that the United States does not have its own concerns and priorities in cross-strait relations and will just act as an indifferent bystander. Some Americans still feel uneasy about the prospects of cross-strait reconciliation. As stated in a *Washington Time* editorial, "The United States welcomes the easing of tensions yet simultaneously fears that the closer ties will push Taiwan further into China's orbit." In order to prevent this, Washington "must continue to offer Taiwan economic, political and strategic incentives."⁵ Similar concerns were expressed by other American politicians and elites.
- 3.2 In the context of such hidden anxiety, an interesting debate took place recently among U.S. specialists on Taiwan. Some argued that the long-standing U.S. policy goal is to maintain "a balance of power and influence in the Taiwan area favorable to Taiwan and U.S. interests and influenced by the United States."⁶ However this balance has been eroded since Ma Ying-jeou came to power in Taiwan. Others, on the other hand, insisted that the goal of the United States regarding the Taiwan Strait over the last 50 years "has been the

³ "US 'delighted' with state of cross-strait relations," *China Times*, July 19, 2009

⁴ *Xinhua*, "Wang Yi met American officials and politicians," June 25, 2009.

⁵ *Washington Times*, "Editorial: Taiwan's new direction," May 28, 2008.

⁶ Robert Sutter, "Cross-Strait Moderation and the United States—Policy Adjustments Needed," Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies, PacNet Newsletter, no. 17, March 5, 2009

maintenance of peace and stability in the Strait.” Maintaining a balance of power and influence is a means rather than an end.⁷

- 3.3 Such a debate reflects that some Americans continue to regard Taiwan as a strategic asset of the United States in East Asia and perceive the development of cross-strait relations as potentially detrimental to the U.S. interest. As one former Bush Administration official put it, the “loss” of Taiwan will damage America’s broad and long term strategic interests in Asia and effectively deny United States and its allies’ access to critical sea lanes during the time of conflict. Therefore Washington should pursue a policy to “resist the loss of Taiwan to China.”⁸

Maintaining an “unofficial” U.S.-Taiwan relation

- 4.1 One such policy is to enhance U.S.-Taiwan political relations. Even before Ma was elected in March 2008, proposals were made in the Washington policy circle to repair the damaged U.S.-Taipei political relations and significantly upgrade the American unofficial ties with Taiwan.⁹ After Obama came to power, some Congressmen also advocated that the new administration conduct a full Taiwan policy review to remove restrictions on a U.S.-Taiwan contact.¹⁰
- 4.2 So far both the Bush and Obama administrations have handled this issue with caution, but potential problems may still lie ahead. White House declined Ma Ying-jeou’s request to visit Washington before his inauguration. In August

⁷ Richard Bush and Alan Romberg, “Cross-Strait Moderation and the United States—A Response to Robert Sutter,” Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies, PacNet Newsletter, no. 17A, March 12, 2009.

⁸ Randall Schriver, “U.S. policy toward Taiwan,” March 26, 2008, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Schriver.pdf>.

⁹ The upgrading includes lifting restrictions on political interaction with Taiwan by allowing Taiwan’s leaders to visit Washington and more senior American government officials to visit Taiwan, expanding functional interaction at the cabinet level, announcing a common agenda by the secretaries of defense and state on both sides, among other things. See Dan Blumenthal and Randall Schriver, Strengthening Freedom in Asia, A Twenty-First-Century Agenda for the U.S.-Taiwan Partnership, A Report of the Taiwan Policy Working Group, American Enterprise Institute, February 22, 2008, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20080222_TaiwanreportEnglish.pdf.

¹⁰ *Taiwan Times*, “US Congressman calls for overhaul of Taiwan policy,” May 21, 2009.

2008 Ma Ying-jeou made his first “transit” visit to the United States on his way to South and Central America.¹¹ Taipei wanted Ma to be treated with “high protocol” possibly having stopovers in New York City or even visiting Washington. However, United States only agreed to let him transit in Los Angeles and San Francisco to avoid more high-profile cities.

4.3 This “West Coast” model was retained for Ma following two “transit” visits. Although Ma claimed that unlike Chen Shui-bian, he is not interested in “transit diplomacy,” each time he traveled to the U.S., Taipei asked a little more and each time Washington gave a bit more. For example, during the first transit visit, Ma stayed in a Los Angeles hotel for 16 hours without leaving the hotel, not even for attending a dinner by the local Chinese community. In the following two visits, he was allowed to attend such dinners with increasing number of guests from several dozen to several hundreds. In the most recent transit visit in Hawaii in July, for the first time he walked out of the hotel to participate in some public activities.¹²

4.4 American officials involved in these visits indicated that they need to be very careful about handling the protocol of these visits. The Taiwanese side will push a little more each time and it is hard to turn down the requests since U.S.-Taiwan relations are in good shape now. But each time Washington gives in, it sets a precedent which could be difficult to withdraw in the future. How to handle such incremental upgrading of “unofficial” U.S.-Taiwan relations without upsetting Beijing too much could be a challenge for the Obama administration.

Complexity of cross-strait military CBMs

5.1 With cross-strait economic and trade relations booming, both sides began to talk about establishing cross-strait military confidence-building measures (CBMs). CCP General Secretary Hu Jintao formally endorsed this idea in his

¹¹ For Taiwanese leaders’ “transit visits” to the United States in recent years, see Appendix I.

¹² VOA, “Ma Ying-jeou engaged in first public activities for the first time in the United States,” July 6, 2009, <http://www.voanews.com/chinese/w2009-07-06-voa93.cfm>.

“six-point” remarks delivered in December 2008 in which he suggested that both sides could start contacts and exchanges to explore the mechanism of mutual trust on cross-strait military security at a proper time.¹³

5.2 Taipei initially was also very much interested in cross-strait military CBMs. In recent months, however, Taipei is showing its reluctance to move forward on this front emphasizing that the time for cross-strait military CBMs has not come yet and Taiwan is not in a hurry to discuss it with Beijing. Among other things, the concern with the possible repercussion from the United States and impact on Taiwan-U.S. military relations are behind Taipei’s dampened enthusiasm on this issue.

5.3 In this regard Beijing and Taipei have displayed divergent thinking. For Beijing, the military CBMs are strictly matters between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait and should not involve a third party. Logically cross-strait military CBMs imply Taiwan should cut or at least minimize its military ties with Washington. But Ma Ying-jeou made it very clear that the mechanism of military mutual trust is sensitive because it involves Taiwan’s relations with the United States.¹⁴ Taiwanese scholars also point out that Taiwan will be unwilling to sacrifice its military relations with Washington for the sake of establishing military CBMs with Beijing.¹⁵ It is simply too high a price.

5.4 The official attitude of the American government toward cross-strait military CBMs is also supportive. Senior Obama administration officials told visiting Wang Yi that the United States is glad to see the two sides across the Taiwan Strait establish the mechanism of military mutual trust.¹⁶ Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, once offered to host

¹³ *Xinhua*, “To commemorate the 30th anniversary of the mainland’s ‘Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,’ Hu Jintao delivered an important speech,” December 31, 2008.

¹⁴ *PChome*, “The CCP reiterates its desire to develop mechanism on military mutual trust,” April 29, 2009, <http://news.pchome.com.tw/international/bcc/20090429/index-12410031218576121011.html>

¹⁵ *Phtv.ifeng.com*, “Taiwan experts say that Taipei does not think the cross-strait mechanism of military mutual trust is a pressing task,” June 11, 2009.

¹⁶ *Xinhua*, “Wang Yi met American officials and politicians,” June 25, 2009.

direct talks between military officers from the mainland and Taiwan at his headquarters in Hawaii.¹⁷

- 5.5 After his remarks, there were reports that at the invitation of the U.S. Pacific Command (PaCom), military officers from both Taiwan and China will attend in August the Transnational Security Cooperation Course sponsored by Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), a Pentagon-funded think tank, in Hawaii. That will lead to the first direct contact between the two militaries in sixty years.¹⁸
- 5.6 However, in reality American attitudes toward cross-strait military CBMs are more complicated and ambivalent. Very soon sources in Washington clarify that the media reports about such a sponsorship are false.¹⁹ Similarly, the spokesman of China's Taiwan Affairs Office confirmed the reports as "inaccurate."²⁰
- 5.7 Washington is not enthusiastic about Keating's idea of providing good office for the two militaries either. American officials and scholars argue that if Keating's proposal is carried out, this will mean a significant departure from the long-time American policy of not playing a mediator role between China and Taiwan.
- 5.8 Another concern by some in Pentagon is that cross-strait military CBMs may increase the chance of sensitive weapon technology and military information provided by the U.S. to Taiwan ending up in the hands of the Chinese military as some military CBMs require increasing transparency towards each other. Therefore cross-strait military CBMs may lead Washington to reconsider its arms sale to Taiwan in the future.

¹⁷ *New York Times*, "Hopes for U.S. military ties with China," February 18, 2009.

¹⁸ *Global Times*, "Taiwan media says that the two militaries cross-strait will have their first contact in sixty years," March 30, 2009.

¹⁹ *DefensNews*, "Taiwan-China mil-to-mil report false," April 3, 2009.

²⁰ *Chinenews.com*, "Li Weiwei: 'two militaries on the two shores will have contact under the U.S. sponsorship' inaccurate," April 15, 2009.

Arms sale: “the biggest obstacle”

- 6.1 Ever since Sino-American relations were established in the 1970s, American arms sales to Taiwan have proved to be the thorniest issue in the relationship, disrupting normal interactions between the two countries from time to time. This issue has not disappeared with the new developments in cross-strait relations. Rather it has become even more delicate under new circumstances and still has the potential of derailing the trilateral relationship.
- 6.2 In his first term in office President George W. Bush was considered the “most pro-Taiwan” president in recent American administrations. In April 2001 he approved a package of arms sale to Taiwan valued at nearly \$5 billion, the largest in a decade including some offensive weapons that Washington had refrained from selling before such as submarines.²¹ However, because of domestic partisan infighting in Taiwan’s legislature, the package was largely undelivered as the pan-blue camp in the legislative body blocked funding for the purchase.
- 6.3 This situation began to change after Ma Ying-jeou was elected. From the very beginning, he made it very clear that although improving relations with the mainland is one of his top priorities, Taiwan will continue to purchase arms from the United States, particularly more advanced weapons such as F-16 C-D to meet Taiwan’s security needs.
- 6.4 Initially the Bush administration also pushed the new government in Taiwan to spend more on defense.²² However, with the significant reduction of tension in the Taiwan Strait and the Bush administration’s strong desire to maintain stable and cooperative U.S.-China relations, it became more delicate business for Washington to justify arms sales to Taiwan. The timing for such a sale also became sensitive as Beijing and Taipei quickly jump started their

²¹ For the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in recent decades, see Appendix II.

²² “American officials laid down five expectations of cross-strait relations after Ma won the election,” DWNEWS.COM, March 25, 2008.

direct dialogues and China was busy preparing its historical Olympics, which President Bush was committed to attend.

- 6.5 It was reported that the White House had decided to suspend the arms sales at least until after Beijing Olympics. Admiral Keating publicly confirmed his administration's intention on July 16, 2008. He articulated that it was based on the understanding that "there is no pressing, compelling reasons for, at this moment, arms sales to Taiwan."²³
- 6.6 Although the State Department spokesman quickly reiterated that the U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan had not changed and denied there was a freeze,²⁴ there was evidence that the new situation in the Taiwan Strait made some senior American leaders including President Bush to pause on this critical issue in cross-strait relations.²⁵
- 6.7 After a long delay the Bush administration finally notified the Congress of the arms sales before it recessed in October 2008. The package of \$6.5 billion included some of the weaponry that Taiwan wanted, but omitted some items on Taiwan's wish list such as Black Hawk helicopters and the designs for submarines. For the item Taiwan wanted the most, the F-16 C-D fighter jets, Washington asked Taipei to keep it off the list.
- 6.8 Beijing reacted quickly (see Appendix III). It strongly condemned the American action and summoned the U.S. embassy official to protest. It immediately suspended most military exchanges with the U.S. The dialogues

²³ *AFP*, "US admiral acknowledges arms sales freeze on Taiwan," July 16, 2008.

²⁴ "US State Dept Daily Press Briefing," July 18, 2008, <http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0807/S00581.htm>.

²⁵ *Washington Post*, "Top U.S. officials stalling Taiwan arms package," June 12, 2008; David Brown, "China-Taiwan relations: dialogue resumes in relaxed atmosphere," *Comparative Connections*, July 2008.

on non-proliferation between the Foreign Ministry and the Department of State were postponed as well.²⁶

- 6.9 The bad feeling caused by the arms sale was still lingering even after President Obama took office. Although mil-to-mil talks have been resumed at the urge of the United States, the Chinese military was still reluctant to restore full-scale mil-to-mil exchanges insisting that the Taiwan issue remained China's "core interest and concern" and urged the U.S. to "stop upgrading substantive military relations with Taiwan, stop selling arms and take concrete actions in support of the peaceful development of cross-Straits ties."²⁷
- 6.10 The arms sales to Taiwan in October 2008 were in reality incomplete. Among the request of \$11 billion from Taiwan, Washington only approved \$6.5 billion. It did not turn down the rest of the request, but only said it was under consideration including Black Hawk helicopters, diesel-electric submarine designs, and some PAC-III missiles. F-16 C-D still tops Taiwan's shopping list. In recent months, Taipei has intensified its push for F-16 and other arms. Funds necessary to purchase these weapons have been approved by the Legislative Yuan.²⁸
- 6.11 Therefore it is just a matter of time before the U.S. government has to make decision on this issue again. At his confirmation hearing for the position of assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs, Kurt Campbell for the first time acknowledged that the Obama administration was working on the outstanding request for arms sales to Taiwan.²⁹ In his testimony to the Congress in February 2009, U.S. National Intelligence Director Admiral

²⁶ Bonnie Glaser, "U.S.-China relations: ties solid for transition, but challenges lurk," *Comparative Connections*, January 2009.

²⁷ *Xinhua*, "China-U.S. military ties 'remain difficult,'" February 27, 2009.

²⁸ *Reuters*, "Exclusive-Taiwan renews push for U.S. F-16 fighters," March 15, 2009.

²⁹ *Taipei Times*, "Campbell confirms arms talks," June 12, 2009.

Dennis Blair suggested that China's massive military spending will spur continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to maintain a military balance.³⁰

- 6.12 One speculation about the timetable of a new arms sale is that a recommendation to sell F-16s and other weapons will go to the State Department, the Pentagon and the White House in early September. President Obama will announce the new arms sale after his visit to China in November. It will then go to the Congress for approval in late November and early December.³¹
- 6.13 Beijing of course is trying to do everything it can to stall further arms sales to Taiwan by the Obama administration. During the 10th Sino-American Defense Consultative Talks in June, Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian described the U.S. arms sale as "the greatest obstacle in Sino-American relations" and urged the U.S. side to scrap the \$6.5 billion in arms sales to Taiwan.³² The issue has been raised in every mil-to-mil talk between the two countries since December 2008.
- 6.14 During his first visit to the United States as the director of State Council's Taiwan Affairs Office, Wang Yi also focused on the possible U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and argued that improved cross-strait relations made it unnecessary for Taiwan to buy more arms from the U.S. However, the American side responded that China's own military buildup and its failure to reduce the large missile force aimed at Taiwan did not give Washington much confidence in Wang's argument.³³
- 6.15 In sum, the U.S. arms sales could be a time bomb in the otherwise uneventful Washington-Beijing-Taiwan trilateral relations. Ma Ying-jeou's calculation is that Taipei can pursue the parallel courses of improving cross-strait relations

³⁰ *Associated Press*, "US intel chief warns again China-Taiwan conflict," February 12, 2009.

³¹ *Taipei Times*, "US talks 'disappoint' Chinese official," June 27, 2009.

³² *AFP*, "China urges US to scrap Taiwan arms sale," June 22, 2009.

³³ *Taipei Times*, "US talks 'disappoint' Chinese official," June 27, 2009.

and purchasing arms from the United States to strengthen its defense. However, the extent of Beijing's tolerance level towards Taipei's military relations and arms deals with Washington remains to be seen.

6.16 By the same token the arms sale to Taiwan could significantly hinder Sino-American relations, particularly in the military and security areas. As a matter of fact, the mil-to-mil relations between the two countries have become a hostage to the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, making it the weakest link in the extensive system of U.S-China dialogues and consultations. In this respect, the Taiwan issue remains the main source of mutual strategic mistrust and suspicions between the two countries.

6.17 Therefore to maintain the momentum of "peaceful development" in the Taiwan Strait, all three parties need to take a fresh and more creative approach and to find a way to manage, if not resolve, the problem. In 2002 then Chinese President Jiang Zemin proposed to then President George W. Bush that if the United States could restrain arms sales to Taiwan, China would consider reducing its missile deployment along the Taiwan Strait. Reportedly the U.S. response at that time was that China needed to talk to Taiwan about this issue, which was impossible for Beijing to do at that time. Maybe the time has come now for all three parties to revisit this proposal to minimize the potentially negative impact of arms sales on trilateral relations.

**APPENDIX I TAIWANESE LEADERS’ “TRANSIT VISITS” TO THE
UNITED STATES (2000-2009)**

	Date	Locations
Chen Shui-Bian		
	2000.8	Los Angeles
	2001.5-6	New York, Houston
	2003.10-11	New York, Alaska
	2004.8-9	Hawaii, Seattle
	2005.1	Guan
	2005.5	Guan
	2005.9	Miami, San Francisco
	2006.5	Alaska, Hawaii (declined)
	2006.9	Guan
	2007.1	San Francisco, Los Angeles
	2007.8	Alaska, Alaska
	2008. 1	Alaska, Alaska
Ma Ying-jeou		
	2008.8	Los Angeles, San Francisco
	2009.5	Los Angeles, Seattle
	2009.7	San Francisco, Hawaii

APPENDIX II MAJOR U.S. ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN SINCE 1990*

Year	Value (\$ in million)	Main items (quantity)
1990	108	Radar equipment for aircraft
1991	119	M60A3 tanks (111)
1992	126	SM-I Standard air defense missiles (207)
	5,800	F-16 A-B fighters (150)
	1,300	Modified Air Defense System (3)
	161	SH-2F LAMPS Anti-submarine helicopters (12)
1993	620	C-130H transport aircraft (12)
	900	E-2T Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft (4)
1994	230	Lease of Knox-class frigates (3)
1996	420	Stinger surface-to-air missiles (1,299)
	223	M60 A3 tanks (300)
1997	479	AH-IW Super Cobra helicopters (21)
	172	OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters (13)
1998	300	Knox-class frigates (3)
	281	Harpoon anti-ship (58) and Stinger missiles (61)
	486	Chinook helicopters (9)
1999	400	Hawkeye 2—E airborne early warning aircraft (2)
2000	490	Hawk air defense missiles (162), AIM-120C air-to-air missiles (200), and Harpoon missiles (71)
	405	M109A5 howitzers (146), SINCGARS radio systems (152)
2001	5,000 (approved by Bush)	Including diesel-electric submarines (8), Kidd-class destroyers (4), P-3C Orion anti-submarine aircraft (12), Harpoon anti-ship cruise missiles (44), MH-54 mine-sweeping helicopters (12), AAV7A1 amphibious assault vehicles (54), Mark-48, AN/ALE-50 self-propelled howitzers (144), etc.
	725	Joint Tactical Information Distribution Systems terminals for data links between aircraft, ships, and ground stations
2002	250	AAV7AI assault amphibious vehicles (54)
	875	Kidd-class destroyers (4)
2003	775	Multi-functional Information Distribution Systems
2004	1,776	Long Range Early Warning Radars
2005	280	Sidewinder (10) and Sparrow air-to-air missiles
2007	818	AMRAAMs (218), Maverick air-to-ground missiles (235), Harpoon missiles (60), and Block IIIA air-defense missiles (144)
	1,960	P-3C maritime patrol/ASW aircraft (12)
	930	Patriot configuration 2 ground system upgrade
2008	3,347	Patriot PAC-3 missiles (330) Harpoon missiles (32), and Javelin anti-armor missiles (182)
	2,532	Apache attack helicopters (30)
	584	Spare parts and upgrading for aircrafts

*The table is by no means exhaustive. It just lists some major purchased and proposed arms deals to show the quantity and quality of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and their trend over time. Sources: Shirley Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, Congressional Research Service, February 11, 2009 and Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), "Arms sales to Taiwan-statements and developments," http://nuclearthreatinitiative.org/_aboutnti/b_index.html

APPENDIX III “10.3” ARMS SALE AND SINO-AMERICAN MILITARY RELATIONS

Date	Interactions
10.3.2008	President Bush announced the arms sale of \$6.5 billion to Taiwan.
10.2008	China cancelled mutual visits of the Chinese Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Xu Caihou and U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey, cancelled the working-level talks on China’s Defense White Paper and the Pentagon’s report on Chinese military power, and also postponed the dialogues on non-proliferation between the Foreign Ministry and the Department of State.
10 and 11. 2008	China permitted American warships to visit Hong Kong.
12.2009	In an attempt to resume military exchanges, U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David Sedney visited Beijing and met with PLA Assistant Chief of General Staff Chen Xiaogong.
2.2009	U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense David Sedney and Chinese Director of Foreign Affairs Office of National Defense Ministry held Defense Policy Coordination Talk. The Chinese side was reluctant to fully restore mil-to-mil relations because of the “10.3” arms sale.
6.2009	U.S Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy and Chinese Deputy Chief of General Staff Ma Xiaotian held the 10 th Sino-American Defense Consultative Talks. Ma described the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan as “the greatest obstacle in Sino-American relations.”
6.2009	Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command described the mil-to-mil dialogue with China as “not robust right now” and “essentially on hold” since the Taiwan arms sale.
7.2009	The press release of the first round of U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue announced that the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission General Xu Caihou will visit the United States within 2009.
8.2009	Chinese Chief of General Staff Chen Bingde met with visiting Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army General George Casey. Chen once again pointed out that the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan had harmed China’s core interests.