

**OBAMA'S ASIAN POLICY:
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY**

YOU Ji

EAI Background Brief No. 425

Date of Publication: 21 January 2009

Executive Summary

1. On 20 January 2009 Barack Obama became America's 44th president, ushering in a new era amidst great volatilities in the world. In Asia, people are anxious to know the bases of his Asian policy.
2. Obama pursued his presidential campaign on a policy platform of change. However, is change his central theme in formulating US' Asian policy in the next four to eight years?
3. In the area of foreign policy, change will be embedded in continuity. Firstly, the structure of US strategic interests has its inherent track that cannot be changed promptly.
4. Among other things five dominant US regional interests will continue: preventing the emergence of a power that will challenge US leadership; ensuring security for the allies; combating terrorism; promoting democracy and maintaining economic prosperity (currently combating financial crisis and recession).
5. Secondly, Bush of the 43th presidency has actually run an effective Asian policy: Sino-US relations are arguably at their best and the ties between the US and its regional allies are as solid, the two cornerstones for US leadership in the Far East.
6. Thirdly, all the regional flashpoints are relatively under control, e.g., the North Korean nuclear standoff, the Taiwan tension, and the Spratlys disputes. There is little sign of any crisis in the making.
7. On the other hand, there is visible room for change if Obama intends to sustain US' leading position in Asia, even though fundamental changes will be more about attitudes than policies *per se*.

8. Firstly, Obama would alter the way through which Bush seeks US global leadership: relying too much on wielding hard power and often resorting to unilateralism. Obama's approach will be more consultative and multilateral.
9. Secondly, in East Asia, complaints are often heard about Bush's relative neglect of the region, as compared with other parts of the world, e.g., Middle East. US-Japan alliance needs repair; Korea's anti-Americanism needs to be addressed; and US-ASEAN ties need to be revitalized.
10. Thirdly, fulfilling campaign promise to withdraw US troops from Iraq would be the first step for Obama to alter the basic guidance for war against terror: using force to tackle the roots of terrorism, a tough challenge for him in his presidency.
11. Generally Obama is facing a region undergoing dynamic restructuring, with China's rise, Japan's power normalization (正常国家化) and relative decline of US influence. His response will be one of adaptation and this will form the foundation of his Asian policy.
12. He will strengthen bilateral alliance and heighten relations with ASEAN, as the basic hedging approach vis-à-vis China's rise. The fundamental purpose is to not only maintain strategic access for US forward deployment but also broaden it.
13. This approach is pursued in parallel with Obama's need to cooperate with China. His global leadership cannot be effective if challenged by Beijing. Yet Beijing's promise not to challenge US leadership opens space for this cooperation, the crux for a successful US Asian policy.
14. US' East Asia strategy will likely shift from its sole anchorage on bilateral alliance with Japan and others to a dual one that includes US-China engagement. Although the logic for this is plain enough, the adjustment is easily said than done. It requires enormous ideational emancipation and difference accommodation on the part of Obama and support from US allies, another challenge to Obama's Asian policy.

OBAMA’S ASIAN POLICY: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY

YOU Ji*

A New Beginning for Obama

- 1.1 On 20 January 2009 Barack Obama became the 44th US president, ushering in a new era amidst great volatilities and opportunities. In his inaugural address, he has laid priority on domestic politics as he identified combating a deepening economic crisis as his most urgent task. Externally, he would spare no effort in strengthening US global leadership.¹ The war against terror will be a key component in this effort. If he can pull US troops out of Iraq in time, he will have wider strategic options in coping with the fast changing world order, itself a challenge to unipolarity.
- 1.2 In Asia, people are anxious to know the bases of Obama’s Asian policy that is yet to be adequately clarified. Hillary Clinton’s testimony speech on her confirmation as secretary of the state on 14 January 2009 may shed good light on an understanding of Obama’s overall foreign policy in the next four to eight years.
- 1.3 Central to her speech is the concept of the US as a “smart power” which combines the country’s great economic and military hard power and its world appealing soft power of democracy and freedom. She has laid down a number of important guiding principles: 1) diplomacy takes priority over employment

* Dr You Ji is Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute. He would like to thank Prof Zheng Yongnian and Prof John Wong for their helpful comments.

¹ Obama’s inaugural address, Washington D.C., 20 January 2009.

of force; 2) diplomacy is based on principles and pragmatism; and 3) diplomacy is about communication and consultation.²

- 1.4 These mark a visible departure from Bush's foreign policy behavior and policy orientation. "Smart power" is a rebuke to Bush's convenient use of force to deal with complex situations. Emphasis on diplomacy means that Obama would have a distinctive leadership style over world affairs: relying more on cooperation, multilateralism and persuasion to secure vital US interests. Leadership would be more effective if conducted through persuasion from a position of strength than unilateral military pressure. This is the embodiment of Obama's campaign platform of change.
- 1.5 Under Obama a two-ponged strategy may emerge to guide US Asian policy: enhancing alliance against any potential challenger and engaging China to stabilize the security situation in the Far East. On these two fronts the overall situation is positive to Obama. Japan and South Korea would reciprocate Obama's efforts to repair the alliance. China is willing to cooperate where it can, as it serves its interests in doing so.
- 1.6 In Southeast Asia Obama has promised to revitalize US-ASEAN relations. He would first redress the neglect ASEAN has felt during the Bush administration. This is important both as a necessity and a choice: America needs military access to the region and there are no fundamental and outstanding problems between the two sides. As pointed out by Obama's key Asian affairs advisors, he will allocate more attention and resources to Southeast Asia.³

² Hillary Clinton's testimony to the Congress on her confirmation as secretary of the state. 14 January 2009.

³ This was claimed by Obama's representative Ambassador Robert Gelbard in a debate on Asian policy with McCain's representative Daniel Blumenthal. Debate organized by the National Bureau of Asian Research, Washington D.C. 22 September 2008.

Change, Continuity and Challenges

- 2.1 In Asia, people are anxious to know the bases of his Asian policy that is yet to be adequately clarified. Obama pursued his presidential campaign on a policy platform of change. Is change his central theme in formulating US Asian policy in the next four to eight years? If it is, what change has he in mind in advancing America's interests?
- 2.2 Obama's campaign slogan of change appealed to American voters. Yet in practice change is not for change's sake. In Asia it has to be designed to advance US' strategic interests. Since the structure of these interests has its inherent track linking the past and future, change cannot happen promptly and in isolation. It has to be embedded in continuity.
- 2.3 Firstly, continuity in US' core regional interests remains unchanged. Five of them have been central to all US presidents since WWII and will guide Obama as well. Topping the list is the prevention of the emergence of a power that will challenge US' dominance. Next is to ensure security for US allies. The third is to promote Asian democratization. The fourth is to sustain economic prosperity through market and free trade.⁴ Since 2001 war against terror has been a new priority in US' foreign policy agenda in the region.
- 2.4 In policy terms these interests may dictate a familiar pattern of measures for Obama. Missions one and two will let the US strengthen its bilateral alliances in the region. The third will see Obama highlighting his Party's tradition of promoting human rights as a foreign policy focus. The economic mission has an immediate goal of combating global economic crisis but in the long run will be pursued to facilitate integration, also a Democrats' tradition. On war against terror Obama does not have other alternatives but to continue with it indefinitely.

⁴ Richard B. Doyle, "The U.S. National Security Strategy: policy, process problems", *Public Administration Review*, July/August 2007.

- 2.5 Continuity also reflects a fact that Bush in his second term has actually run an effective Asian policy: Sino-US relations are arguably at their best, and the ties between the US and its regional allies are solid.⁵ These have been the two cornerstones of US diplomacy in the Far East.⁶ In addition the US has improved relations with South Asian and ASEAN countries.
- 2.6 Almost all the flashpoints in East Asia are under control. With the help of China the US has moved to stabilize the precarious situation in the Korean Peninsula, achieving the initial success of disabling key DPRK nuclear facilities. The Taiwan tension has been visibly eased with KMT in power. The Spratlys disputes have been deprived of the trigger of war, thanks to China signing the ASEAN Treaty of Amity in 2002. There is little sign of any serious crisis in the making that requires the US to take any immediate counter-measures.
- 2.7 On the other hand, there is visible room for change if Obama is to sustain US regional domination, not only in specific policies but more so in terms of attitudes. Obama admitted that although US-Asia relations are stable, they are stagnant these past few years.⁷ Therefore, there is a need to revitalize US-Asia ties.
- 2.8 First he has to alter the way through which Bush seeks US leadership: reliance on hard power, especially military means to campaign for American interests. Unilateralism in Bush's second term was more of a mind-set than policy orientation but it still reflected an anachronistic mentality in a world of globalization. In view of its damage to US foreign policy, Obama has to start

⁵ Victor D. Cha, "Winning Asia: Washington's Untold Success Story", *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2007.

⁶ You Ji, "China's New Diplomacy, Foreign Policy and Defense Strategy", in Stuart Harris, Qin Yaqing (秦亚青) and Pauline Kerr (eds.), *China's New Diplomacy: Tactical or Fundamental Change?* Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

⁷ Barack Obama, "Strengthening US Relations with Asia", August 2008, quoted from *Comparative Connections*, October 2008, p. 1.

anew in formulating his own guiding principle centered on adaptation to changes in Asia.⁸

2.9 Specifically this principle will reflect Obama's new style of leadership over foreign affairs: more consultative and multilateral. More emphasis will be laid on diplomacy than on pressure, as an expression of US smart power. Only through such a profound change in attitudes can the world's respect of the US as a model be restored.⁹

2.10 Secondly, the region expects Obama to adjust the priorities of US' diplomacy. In East Asia complaints are often heard about Bush's neglect of the region where America's vital security and economic interests exceed other parts of the world.¹⁰ Along this line many argue that US-Japan alliance needs repair; Korea's public anger against Washington needs to be placated; and US-ASEAN ties need to be revitalized. These are the essential areas for Obama to redress.¹¹

2.11 Thirdly, the Iraqi War has a major negative impact on America's overall strategic posture. If Obama fulfills his promise to withdraw US troops from Iraq by 2011, he would be better positioned to handle major power interactions, although this is easily said than done.¹² His promise has helped him claim a moral high ground at home and abroad where anti-US sentiment is closely associated with the war. Economically the end of US occupation will remove an expensive source of budgetary constraints at this critical moment of recession.

⁸ Richard Holbrook, "The Next President: Mastering a Daunting Agenda", *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2008.

⁹ Hillary Clinton's testimony to the Congress.

¹⁰ In the last few years whenever there was a schedule clash in Bush's and Rice's foreign visits, they would tend to drop East Asia. This is especially true in the case of the Middle East. Examples are abundant with the latest one being Rice's last minute cancelation of her China and Japan visits in order to focus on the Gaza war.

¹¹ Yoichi Funabashi, "Keeping Up with Asia", *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2008

¹² For instance, many analysts argue that China is the biggest winner in the war on terror as it has provided China with a "strategic opportunity period" to concentrate on development at home.

- 2.12 Fourthly, the Iraqi War has proved that regime change and military means not only are wrong prescriptions to topple the so-called “rogue states”, but may even worsen the roots of international terrorist threats. The risks have been recognized by Obama, as he may take a nuanced approach to tackle the remaining “axes of evil”, North Korea and Iran, and for this matter, Burma. Although pressure persists for Obama to deal with these challenges, there is an array of other policy options, including dialogue. Positioning the US as a smart power may have become Obama’s “New Deal”.¹³

Consolidating Bilateral Alliance

- 3.1 The biggest policy challenge that Obama faces in Asia is how to respond to the dynamic restructuring of the regional order due to China’s rise, Japan’s power normalization and relative decline of US influence, partially due to mounting anti-Americanism as the result of Bush’s unilateralism.¹⁴ Although Obama’s East Asian policy has not been announced officially, there are logical traces to follow in assessing his future strategies vis-à-vis the region.¹⁵

A two-pronged strategy

- 3.2 Obama would adopt a two-pronged strategy: 1) strengthen bilateral alliance with Japan and Korea, as the basic hedging approach vis-à-vis China’s rise and the resultant restructuring of the regional order;¹⁶ 2) in parallel with this Obama will see increased necessity to cooperate with China in dealing with economic and security challenges globally and in Asia, i.e., the international economic meltdown and the North Korea nuclear problem.¹⁷

¹³ The change in approach has been preliminarily spelt out by Hillary Clinton in her Senate confirmation testimony on 14 January 2009.

¹⁴ David Shambaugh (ed.), *Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics*, University of California Press, 2005.

¹⁵ Hillary Clinton’s speech on 14 January 2009 provided good clues for a understanding of Obama’s foreign policy and his Asian policy as well. See footnote 9.

¹⁶ Obama’s testimony, *Floor Statement, Congressional Record*, April 25, 2007.

¹⁷ Andrew MacIntyre, “Obama and Asia”, *East Asia Forum*, 12 January 2009.

- 3.3 It is generally recognized in Washington that without a solid alliance mechanism in Asia it is difficult for US' hedging strategy vis-à-vis China to work.¹⁸ At the same time US' global leadership cannot be effective if it is challenged by China. That Beijing has promised not to challenge US leadership opens space for this cooperation, the crux for a successful US Asian policy.¹⁹
- 3.4 This means that US' Asian policy is poised to shift from its previous sole anchorage on bilateral alliance to a dual one adding US-China engagement as the center of the policy. While the logic for this change is plain enough, the policy adjustment is easily said than done; it requires ideational emancipation and difference accommodation on the part of Obama. Resistance from US allies to this change can well be anticipated, another major challenge to Obama's Asian policy.²⁰ Although US' relations with its traditional allies in Asia remain strong, they are not without thorns that have to be dealt with.

Addressing thorns in US-Japan Relations

- 3.5 Traditionally Japanese elites are suspicious of US democrats who are considered as less sympathetic to Japan, leaning more toward China in the tripartite interaction, and belittling Japan's role in world affairs. This exaggerated perception is somewhat understandable. Jimmy Carter set diplomatic relations with China as a way to build a strategic triangular relationship against the USSR but his "overhead" diplomacy was kept from the Japanese.²¹ Bill Clinton started his administration with a Japan bashing.

¹⁸ For instance, Dan Blumenthal (扑大年) suggested that Obama should make US-Japan alliance more tuned to contain China. *Huanqiu Shibao*, 9 January 2009.

¹⁹ Wang Jisi, "China's Changing Role in Asia", *The Atlantic Council Paper*, January 2004. For Obama's China policy, please refer to *EAI Background Brief No. 426* on "Obama's China Policy: Continuity Rather Than Change".

²⁰ Masashi Nishihara, "What to expect from the New US Administration", *AJISS-Commentary*, no. 53, 9 January 2009

²¹ "中美建交秘闻：1972-1978"，凤凰卫视，2009年1月11日。

- 3.6 These perceptions have conveniently influenced Japanese leaders when they assess Obama's Japan policy. They have repeatedly expressed their worry over Obama's potential and relative neglect of Japan in recent months, both as a reminder to the White House and as a pressure tactic to call attention.²² There is a reason for Japan's elites to be concerned.
- 3.7 In his presidential race Obama spent more time explaining his China policy than his Japan policy. His White House team on Asia consists of over 60 people, the majority of them being China experts. Even his would-be ambassador to Japan Joseph Nye is regarded as knowledgeable more on China than on Japan.²³ In the history of US-Japan relations the Clinton era registered many cases of unpleasant encounters between the two powers. Obama's team is basically composed of Clinton's old hands, especially the secretary of state. Clearly Clinton's Asian policy serves as the starting point for Obama's.²⁴
- 3.8 On specific issues, Tokyo would hope that Obama takes a positive-sum foreign trade policy to combat the on-going international economic storm. The successive Democrats administrations were inclined to yield to protectionism pressure at home, as they were politically allied with the trade unions. Japan's export to the US would bear the first brunt each time America suffers a recession.²⁵
- 3.9 One keen challenge for Obama is to strike a balance between further inducing Kim Jong-Il to renounce his nuclear programs and placating Japan that is strongly opposed to Washington's removal of the DPRK from the list of terrorist countries in December 2008. The Japanese believe that their naval

²² Funabashi, "Keeping Up with Asia".

²³ One clear example is the article by one of Obama's top foreign policy advisors, Richard Holbrook, that explains his overall diplomatic strategy as a presidential candidate. Throughout the article Japan was not mentioned even once but China was mentioned many times. Richard Holbrook, "The Next President: Mastering a Daunting Agenda", *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2008.

²⁴ According to Stuart Holliday, a member of Bush's power transition team in 2000, presidential personnel is policy. *E. journal of the US State Department*, Vol. 14, no. 1, 2009.

²⁵ Michael Armacost, *Friends or Rivals: The Insider's Account of US-Japan Relations*, New York: Colombia University Press, 1996.

logistical support to the allied operations in Iraq would be rewarded by the US continuing pressure on Pyongyang over the abduction issue. Bush's de-listing act was regarded as a betrayal and damaged US-Japan alliance relations that Obama has to repair.²⁶

- 3.10 Yet in Washington's hierarchy of importance North Korea's nuclear disarmament exceeds the abduction issue. This leaves little room for compromise. Furthermore, Obama has openly expressed approval of Bush's de-listing and even hinted to meet Kim Jong-Il if the nuclear standoff could be resolved.²⁷ If Obama indeed resorts to Clinton's DPRK policy or continues Bush's, tension in bilateral ties with Japan will soon set in.

Challenges in US-ROK relations

- 3.11 US-South Korea ties have not been easy for many years. Some analysts argue that the alliance is just in name.²⁸ The list of challenges is long but the solution list seems to be short. The prominent disputes include US' lukewarm responses to the "sunshine policy" initiated by Kim Deazhong but enhanced by Roh Moo-hyun; Seoul's insistence on peaceful settlement of the nuclear standoff, which the US regarded as restricting its options; and Roh's clear indication that South Korea would not send troops to assist the US in a Taiwan war. This has been criticized as evading its commitment as the ally of the US.²⁹

- 3.12 Lee Myung-bak's right-wing policy has helped to improve US-ROK ties. Yet the thorns persist and constantly trouble the bilateral ties. Lee's ruling party has advocated a tough anti-North policy. While this was welcomed by hardliners (neo-cons) in Washington, it has caused worry when Bush tried to

²⁶ Nishihara, op cit.

²⁷ Obama Statement on US-North Korea nuclear agreement, 11 October 2008.

²⁸ Sun-won Park, "Challenges in Alliance Management between Washington and Seoul", *Brookings Institution Newsletter*, 17 December 2008.

²⁹ Joel S. Wit, "Enhancing U.S. Engagement with North Korea", *Washington Quarterly* Spring 2007.

achieve progress in denuclearization through concessions to North Korea.³⁰ Worsening tension between North and South has become a negative asset in the Six Party Talks. If Obama hopes to attain any breakthroughs in denuclearizing North Korea in the next few years, he has to coordinate the policy differences with Seoul.

3.13 One outstanding problem is South Korea's public opposition to US beef export. This is related to its popular anger with the US-ROK Free Trade Agreement, signed in 2008 but not approved by the legislature.³¹ This Agreement has stimulated large scale violent protests in South Korea. It is well known that US Democrats often take a dubious view on FTA issues. It is not surprising if Obama acts against the agreement, as indicated in his campaign speeches.³²

3.14 But what is more fundamental is for Obama to redress the deeply embedded and mounting anti-Americanism among large sections of Korean people. Crimes committed by US soldiers in Korea, the tough US DPRK policy, and America's often heavy-handed approach toward Seoul have generated considerable bitterness among the population.³³ This is the reality that Obama has to face, a reality he cannot do much to change qualitatively.

Heighten relations with ASEAN

4.1 Vocolly Washington has positioned ASEAN as a key geo-strategic component of US' hedging strategy vis-à-vis the changing balance of power in Asia. Yet in practice, this has not been the case. For instance, Bush never has a high

³⁰ Clearly this was intended to show to the world that Bush had made some foreign policy achievement during his administration.

³¹ But the agreement has not been approved by the parliaments of both countries.

³² He once said "the bilateral trade should pay attention to our key industrial and agricultural sectors, such as autos, rice and beef, and to protection of labor and environment standards. Regrettably, US-Korea FTA does not meet this standard". Obama's testimony, *Floor Statement, Congressional Record*, 11 February, 2008.

³³ Meredith Woo-Cumings, *South Korea Anti-Americanism*, Working Paper No. 93, Japan Policy Research Institute, 2003.

regard for ARF, the ASEAN centered regional security mechanism. So ASEAN's complaints against US neglect are getting louder. The question is whether the situation could be rectified by Obama in any fundamental way. The US always has a hierarchy of importance associated with countries in Asia.

- 4.2 At least Obama has shown a willingness to rectify the neglect. It is even proposed that he should make his first overseas visit to Indonesia, under the excuse that he spent his childhood in Jakarta.³⁴ Not a bad idea, given the fact that Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world and can positively contribute to the global war on terror. ASEAN has considerable strategic value to America. This is recognized by Obama in his campaign *Blueprint for Change*. In the book he identified ASEAN and APEC as the multilateral organizations with which he has to strengthen ties, a visible difference from Bush's view since 2001.³⁵
- 4.3 Southeast Asia is a key area for the US to deal with terrorist threats. Consciously or not westerners see a natural connection between Islamism and terrorism. Obama's new approach may help lessen the "clash of civilizations". He made it clear that he is "personally aware of the central role of Muslims in Southeast Asian affairs". In assessing terrorist cells in Asia, e.g., Jemaah Islamiah, he put it in the context that the "overall nature of Islam in Southeast Asia has been an essential component of the region's on-going political and economic change". He would like to listen more carefully to diversified regional views.³⁶
- 4.4 One fundamental purpose for Obama to restore vigorous ties with ASEAN is that the region provides strategic access to US' forward deployment against

³⁴ Peter McCawley, "President Obama to speak in Indonesia", *East Asia Forum*, 16 December 2008. However, this is unlikely to happen.

³⁵ *Blueprint for Change: Obama and Biden's Plan for American People*, Washington D.C.: Obama'08, p. 41.

³⁶ Interview with Obama's campaign adviser Michael Schiffer, *Washington Report*, 16 September 2008.

any potential adversary challenges to the US. For instance, US naval's and air force's access to Singapore's Changi facilities can substantially reduce the reaction time for the US to engage a crisis situation in East Asia, be it in the South China Sea or in the Taiwan Strait. And the Malacca Strait is one of the nine global waterways that the US would like to exercise credible control.

- 4.5 More fundamentally, America has a structural dilemma with the ASEAN. On the one hand, the US fits in well with ASEAN's double balancing strategy. US' military access to Asia is instrumental to containing a potential challenger in the region. On the other, a regional power may help ASEAN offset excessive US intrusion into local affairs, e.g., its interference in ASEAN's domestic politics in the name of protecting human rights. US analysts have found the power equilibrium leaning in favor of China in the last few years. As a result, Obama has been advised to enhance security cooperation with the region immediately upon assuming office.³⁷
- 4.6 Obama has a relatively solid base to work with. The US tsunami relief efforts in 2004 had touched the hearts of many people in Southeast Asia. The resumption of US-Indonesia military relationship is regarded as a suitable reward to Indonesia's gradual progress in democratization and human rights record. Clearly the majority of people in Southeast Asia prefer Obama to McCain as they believe that Obama has a better understanding of the feelings of nations that have traditionally been mistreated.³⁸
- 4.7 If Obama takes a sensible and sensitive ASEAN policy, he should address the following concerns of the people in the region. Firstly, Asian elites hold the view that the Democrats under Clinton were overzealously against Asian values. This has undermined Clinton's Asian policy. Most regional societies are still in the process of promoting human rights. People are worried that Obama adopts a similar pressure-oriented human rights policy against ASEAN

³⁷ "What Obama means to Bangkok", *Asian Times*, 7 November 2008.

³⁸ For instance, in a survey in Jakarta after the US election was over, two thirds of the respondents voiced happiness over Obama's victory vis-à-vis only 12% unhappy. *Huanqishibao*, 6 November 2008.

member states, leaving little room for gradual and peaceful democratization. During the election race, Obama strongly advocated Asian democratization, and especially criticized Burma's human rights situation.³⁹

- 4.8 Secondly, ASEAN hope to see the new president take a more positive view on the ASEAN Treaty of Peace and Amity, in contrast to Bush's position. One of the principles of the Treaty is to prohibit any foreign nation from using force. Bush refused to endorse the Treaty because he would like to leave the option open in case the war against terror in Southeast Asia warrants it. Washington persuaded Canberra not to sign the Treaty and delayed Australia's participation in the East Asian Summit by a number of years. The ASEAN Treaty of Amity is a crucial indicator of Obama's new ASEAN policy in the years ahead.

³⁹

US embassy in Canberra, *Asia Issues and Fact Sheet*, 21 August 2008.